Secure coding in C and C++

CYDCp3d | 3 days | Hands-on

Your application written in C and C++ works as intended, so you are done, right? But did you consider feeding in incorrect values? 16Gbs of data? A null? An apostrophe? Negative numbers, or specifically -1 or -2^{31}? Because that's what the bad guys will do – and the list is far from complete.

Handling security needs a healthy level of paranoia, and this is what this course provides: a strong emotional engagement by lots of hands on labs and stories from real life, all to substantially improve code hygiene. Mistakes, consequences, and best practices are our blood, sweat and tears.

All this is put in the context of C and C++, and extended by core programming issues, discussing security pitfalls of these languages.

So that you are prepared for the forces of the dark side.

So that nothing unexpected happens.

Nothing.

Audience

C/C++ developers

Group size

12 participants

Preparedness

General C/C++ development

Platforms

Linux

Windows

Labs

Hands-on

Outline

- Cyber security basics
- Buffer overflow
- Memory management hardening
- Common software security weaknesses
- Wrap up

Objective list

- Getting familiar with essential cyber security concepts
- Handling security challenges in your C and C++ code
- Identify vulnerabilities and their consequences
- Learn the security best practices in C and C++

Table of contents

Day 1

Case study – Heartbleed

- Pointer manipulation
  - Modification of jump tables
  - Overwriting function pointers

Best practices and some typical mistakes

- Unsafe functions
- Dealing with unsafe functions

Lab – Fixing buffer overflow

- What's the problem with asctime()?

Lab – The problem with asctime()

- Using std::string in C++
- Unterminated strings
- readlink() and string termination
- Manipulating C-style strings in C++
- Malicious string termination

Lab – String termination confusion

- String length calculation mistakes
- Off-by-one errors
- Allocating nothing

Day 2

› Memory management hardening

Securing the toolchain

- Securing the toolchain in C and C++
- Compiler warnings and security
- Using FORTIFY_SOURCE

Lab – Effects of FORTIFY

- AddressSanitizer (ASan)
  - Using AddressSanitizer (ASan)
  - ASan changes to the prologue
  - ASan changes to memory read/write operations
  - ASan changes to the epilogue

Lab – Using AddressSanitizer

- Stack smashing protection
  - Detecting BoF with a stack canary

- Argument cloning
- Stack smashing protection on various platforms
- SSP changes to the prologue and epilogue

Lab – Effects of stack smashing protection

- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
  - ASLR on various platforms

Lab – Effects of ASLR

  - Circumventing ASLR – NOP sleds
- Non-executable memory areas
  - The NX bit
  - Write XOR Execute (W^X)
  - NX on various platforms

Lab – Effects of NX

  - NX circumvention – Code reuse attacks
    - Return-to-libc / arc injection
  - Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
    - Protection against ROP

› Common software security weaknesses

Security features

- Authentication
  - Authentication basics
  - Authentication weaknesses

Case study – PayPal 2FA bypass

- Password management
  - Inbound password management
    - Storing account passwords
    - Password in transit

Lab – Is just hashing passwords enough?

    - Dictionary attacks and brute forcing
    - Salting
    - Adaptive hash functions for password storage
    - Password policy
    - NIST authenticator requirements for memorized secrets

Case study – The Ashley Madison data breach

The dictionary attack

The ultimate crack

Exploitation and the lessons learned

    - Password database migration
  - Outbound password management
    - Hard coded passwords

- Best practices
- *Lab – Hardcoded password*
- Protecting sensitive information in memory
- Challenges in protecting memory
- Heap inspection
- Compiler optimization challenges
- *Lab – Zeroization challenges*
- Sensitive info in non-locked memory

Code quality

- Data
  - Type mismatch
  - *Lab – Type mismatch*
  - Initialization and cleanup
    - Constructors and destructors
    - Initialization of static objects
    - *Lab – Initialization cycles*
    - Array disposal in C++
    - *Lab – Mixing delete and delete[]*
- Memory and pointers
  - Memory and pointer issues
  - Pointer handling pitfalls
  - Pointer usage in C and C++
    - Use after free
    - *Lab – Use after free*
    - *Lab – Runtime instrumentation*
    - Double free
    - Memory leak
    - Smart pointers and RAII
    - Smart pointer challenges

Day 3

› Common software security weaknesses

Input validation

- Input validation principles
  - Blacklists and whitelists
  - Data validation techniques
  - What to validate – the attack surface
  - Where to validate – defense in depth
  - How to validate – validation vs transformations

- Validation with regex
- Injection
  - Injection principles
  - Injection attacks
  - Code injection
    - OS command injection
    - *Lab – Command injection*
    - OS command injection best practices
    - Avoiding command injection with the right APIs
    - *Lab – Command injection best practices*
    - *Case study – Shellshock*
    - *Lab - Shellshock*
    - Process control – library injection
    - DLL hijacking
    - *Lab – DLL hijacking*
- Integer handling problems
  - Representing signed numbers
  - Integer visualization
  - Integer promotion
  - Integer overflow
  - *Lab – Integer overflow*
  - Signed / unsigned confusion
  - *Case study – The Stockholm Stock Exchange*
  - *Lab – Signed / unsigned confusion*
  - Integer truncation
  - *Lab – Integer truncation*
  - *Case study – WannaCry*
  - Best practices
    - Upcasting
    - Precondition testing
    - Postcondition testing
    - Using big integer libraries
    - Best practices in C
    - UBSan changes to arithmetics
    - *Lab – Handling integer overflow on the toolchain level in C/C++*
    - Best practices in C++
    - *Lab – Integer handling best practices in C++*
- Files and streams
  - Path traversal
  - Path traversal-related examples
  - *Lab – Path traversal*
  - Path traversal best practices

- *Lab – Path canonicalization*
- Format string issues
  - The problem with printf()
  - *Lab – Exploiting format string*

Time and state

- Race conditions
  - File race condition
    - *Lab - TOCTTOU*
      - Insecure temporary file

› Wrap up

Secure coding principles

- Principles of robust programming by Matt Bishop
- Secure design principles of Saltzer and Schröder

And now what?

- Software security sources and further reading
- C and C++ resources